genocide in rwanda

Presidential Decision Directive 25:
US Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations

"When I wake up every morning and look at the headlines and the stories and the images on television of these conflicts, I want to work to end every conflict. I want to work to save every child out there. And I know the president does, and I know the American people do. But neither we nor the international community have the resources nor the mandate to do so. So we have to make distinctions. We have to ask the hard questions about where and when we can intervene. And the reality is that we cannot often solve other people's problems; we can never build their nations for them." National Security Advisor Anthony Lake

On May 3, 1994, President Clinton codified a new strategy for participation in international peacekeeping missions with the signing of Presidential Decision Directive 25: US Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations.

This directive establishes criteria to be used in deciding not only whether to commit or withhold American troops from UN operations, but also whether to support or oppose such UN missions at all. Among the factors to be considered before allowing the UN to proceed:

UN involvement advances US interests, and there is an international community of interest for dealing with the problem on a multilateral basis.

There are clear objectives and an understanding of where the mission fits on the spectrum between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

For traditional (Chapter VI) peacekeeping operations, a ceasefire should be in place and the consent of the parties obtained before the force is deployed.

For peace enforcement (Chapter VII) operations, the threat to international peace and security is considered significant.

The means to accomplish the mission are available, including the forces, financing and mandate appropriate to the mission.

The political, economic and humanitarian consequences of inaction by the international community have been weighed and are considered unacceptable.

The operation's anticipated duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending the operation.

Even more stringent criteria must be met for the US to consider taking part in such an action once approved. The document is framed as a cautious hedge of obstacles to UN action and to American participation—a justification for refusal, rather than a stimulus to action. It does not name compelling factors that, if present, would require intervention; only requisite conditions whose absence can justify inaction. Alain Destexhe traces the circular logic: "The PDD trapped the UN in a vicious circle: the United States would refuse any new deployment of UN Blue Helmets unless all the necessary conditions (logistical, financial, troop deployments, etc.) were fulfilled—yet they could never be fulfilled without the active support of the superpower." This "first comprehensive US policy on multilateral peace operations suited to the post-Cold War era", in White House words, is a clear response of withdrawal from interventionism.

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