Employing these tactics requires embracing their inherent contradictions. The Tutsi are sometimes fearsome demonic agents lusting for Hutu blood, sometimes insignificant pests to be swept aside by the inevitably victorious Hutu majority. The Tutsi are all agents of the RPF in concerted league against the Hutu; and yet ‘accusation in a mirror’ leads President Habyarimana to assert that a January 1993 massacre of Tutsi was perpetrated by the RPF. We’ll see, in fact, that the propaganda of the genocide is structured around such logical contradictions. The media and the political actors of the genocide create a climate where everything is true and its opposite too, achieving a meticulously crafted chaos with several profound effects.

First, they are able to strengthen their cause by offering an appeal sufficient to motivate almost anyone. Those Hutu villagers who cannot resolve the faces of their neighbors and colleagues into a demonic cabal with homicidal intentions may perhaps find that a reading of them as petty, insignificant enemies scurrying along in pursuit of personal advancement truly resonates; northerners within earshot of the guns of the RPF advance may find a contemptuous dismissal of Tutsi greed and self-aggrandizement inadequate but be inspired to resist against a foreign army of cruel conquerors bent on pillage and destruction. Indeed, having opposing viewpoints to sift and choose among makes an audience feel intelligent, participatory; convinces them that they are discerning the truth from a forest of conflicting information; achieves a deeper loyalty and more personal commitment to the cause.

Moreover, the culture of contradiction and paradox provides a backdrop for the abolition of the accepted order of conventions, of social bonds, of behavioral taboos. Remember your Macbeth from high-school days. Remember that the play unfolds in a world tightly laced into order. The king’s murder is an unnatural act not as a deed of violence but as an act against the social hierarchy: killing the ordained ruler to whom he has pledged loyalty. Against moral convention: the king is a guest enjoying Macbeth’s shelter, hospitality and protection in that subject’s own house. Against the bonds of the family: Duncan is his own kinsman. To justify such transgressions, Macbeth takes his cue from the play’s climate of contradiction. The deeds are first foretold in a tangle of opposing truths—lesser and greater, not so happy and much happier, to get kings and be none—which cannot be ill and cannot be good, by witches who look like women and also like men, on a day both foul and fair, as all absolute dualities are subverted, good and evil, right and wrong. He steels himself to action by nurturing such an atmosphere, allowing his wife to take the active strategic role in the murder, following her command, clinging to pity and soft familial sympathies, blurring the conventional gender divide. And after the murder the owl eats the falcon, the horses eat each other, the sky looks like night, although at the same time it’s day. Enough, though, of Scotland. We can be prompted by this knowledge, separated by so much space and so much time from the Rwanda genocide, to watch for the Macbeth effect as its propaganda machinery systematically disseminates opposing explanations. I would argue that this deliberate unsettling of the secure order, this exploding of logical truths evokes a climate of moral lawlessness, a mad abandon of an ingrained value system with consequences in each horrifying act to which Rwanda’s citizens are incited.

Finally, the contradictory events and interpretations of the day gave support to two central myths by which the killings can be acknowledged and yet the very existence of genocide is denied. Did these massacres result from a spontaneous eruption of ancient tribal hatred, a populist wave of violence which the Rwandan leadership was powerless to control? Were they all simply wartime casualties of a civil conflict embroiling the whole of the nation? I argue that neither of these explanations is accurate. The use of the word 'genocide' is predicated on the belief that neither of these explanations is accurate. The evidence of history shows that neither of these explanations is accurate. The existence of a state campaign of propaganda obviates any possibility of a groundswell of violence immune to official interference; while hundreds of thousands of unarmed Tutsi, Tutsi infants, even the specially targeted unborn Tutsi children of pregnant Tutsi women would require painstaking historical revision before they can pass as enemy combatants.

—Kangura magazine takes a confrontational tone toward government policy, often berating the Habyarimana administration for not going far enough in restricting Tutsi civil liberties. Editor Hassan Ngeze is arrested in the same sweep which detains other critical journalists, notable the editor of the independent Kanguka.

—RTLM debuts a new formula in Rwandan radio: pop music from Zaire, irreverent on-air personalities, call-in shows where everyday Rwandans can share their views on any subject.

—The CDR party's racial extremism prompts the RPF to oppose its participation in Arusha peace planning, arguing that it’s a radical offshoot of the ruling MRND party formed when MRND moderated its positions in order to remain in power. Thus the party seems to lie outside the mainstream, to give voice to a people disenfranchised by the centrist coalition government.

—The appearance of 42 new journals in 1991 alone seems to signal a burgeoning alternative press. Chief of intelligence Colonel Laurent Serubuga, Habyariman’s brother-in-law, warns the president that army officers are outraged by the creation of political parties and the proliferation of private publications. Convinced that 'the enemy' is hiding behind freedom of expression as a means to gain power, the officers want a law to stop such abuse of the press.

—Party-sponsored militias suggest populist participation, a mobilized public stepping forward to enact their vision for Rwanda's future. In contrast to the uniformed army, militia members wear civilian clothes, drink beer on duty, serve within their own neighborhoods. Technically youth auxiliaries to political parties, the groups symbolize a groundswell of youthful enthusiasm for the politics of their coordinating parties enacted at the community level.

—Kangura is founded and financed by the akazu, and Ngeze is their handpicked choice to lead it. Colonel Nsengiyumva, head of military information, personally takes part in the distribution of Kangura in Kigali, while outside the capital the majority of each pressing is delivered to local mayors for free distribution to their townspeople.
Ngeze not only publicizes but participates as an authority figure in the genocide. Indictments against him at the Arusha tribunal contend that in Gisenyi prefecture on April 7 he personally orders the arrest and death of a Tutsi woman in Gisenyi prefecture; on April 21 another Tutsi is killed at his instigation; between April 6 and May 31 he distributes hand grenades to members of the Interahamwe militia.

—RTLM, founded by governmental officials under the leadership of Habyarimana's brother-in-law and son-in-law, claims the president himself as its largest shareholder. All eight journalists on staff at RTLM when it launches have worked for the government or for official government newspapers. Its mere existence displays official patronage: the government not only grants the station its broadcasting license but also denies licenses to all other applicants, who might provide balancing viewpoints. Radio Rwanda has always been an official organ of the government, used to broadcast town meetings, school exam results and other daily business of the bureaucracy; when RTLM appears on the same frequency many Rwandans assume that the government station had simply changed formats. Thus their virulently anti-Tutsi programming is believed to carry official state sanction. Indeed, the government distributes free radios to some regional civic leaders so that they can stay attuned to the progress of the genocide via RTLM.

—The CDR party campaigns to keep identity cards and racial quotas, policies established by the government and thus part of the mainstream status quo. According to L.R. Melvern, "The CDR, which liked to portray itself as a fringe party, was in fact a mafia of the powerful, created by senior government officials and businessmen. It included such Hutu Power luminaries as Ferdinand Nahimana, a former head of the Rwanda information bureau" who serves as director of RTLM.

—Of those 42 new journals appearing in 1991, at least 11 are known to receive support from the akazu clique, believed by many Rwandans to be the true power behind the throne.

—The Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi militias serve as a coordinated paramilitary force with official sanction. Regular army soldiers and commandos from the national gendarmerie school often serve among their members, who are paid in kind for service, and may attend training camps to maximize killing efficiency. In 1992 at Bugesera, a group of Interahamwe received orders to massacre thousands of Tutsi; afterwards, they were ordered to loot homes and set fires to give the illusion that the killings had resulted from spontaneous ethnic disturbance.

From RTLM broadcasts:
—"We will fight them and we will vanquish them, this is more than certain, all doubt is impossible and if they don’t watch out they will be exterminated... They are a clique representing only a small percentage of the population".

—"The family en route to extinction in Rwanda, then: who is it? It’s the inkotanyi. The Tutsi are a small minority. Before, even if in terms of percentage we consider them to make up 10%, now they represent no more than 8%... well then! Are these people going to continue to kill themselves off, to engage in this suicidal battle against the majority—won’t this truly be the end of them?"

—"By 5 May, the country will be completely cleansed of Tutsis."

—Kangura claims to have discovered a confession from captured RPF soldiers, revealing their ambition to "clean the country of the filth of Hutu". An issue from spring 1994 asserts that the RPF's battle trenches are in fact mass graves for their imminent campaign of elimination against the Hutu.

—Small-scale 'practice massacres' against the Tutsi during 1992 and 1993 are timed to follow RPF attacks, so that they can be described in the media as retaliation for the strikes. In this way, the RPF and the nation's Tusti are logically conflated so that the acts of one are the acts of the other, and the entire Tutsi population is established as an armed opponent living right next door.

—When human rights groups condemn such massacres, the Hutu Power administration tries to deflect criticism for atrocities onto the Tutsi. Hundreds of civilians killed by the RPF during a February 1993 advance are transformed into thousands in the propaganda of the day, with the Rwandan ambassador to the US claiming a body count of 40,200.

—In Jean Mugesera's milestone 1992 speech, he advises: "If you are struck once on one cheek, you should strike back twice", transforming a Hutu instigation of violence into a revenge fantasy when in fact no justifying provocation has been committed. "Know that the person whose throat you do not cut now will be the one who will cut yours."

As Alison Des Forges explains, "Once propagandists had established the supposedly overwhelming threat to Hutu—to their lives and to their very existence as a people, as well as to their freedom and material well-being—it was an easy step to arguing their right—indeed their duty—to defend themselves, their country, and the revolution." Thus is a rhetorical shield of self-defense thrown around their actions.

 

—The names of the youth militia embody their spirit of unity and collective action: Impuzamugambi, "those with only one aim", and Interahamwe, or "those who attack together".

—Language of the genocide is threaded throughout with "culturally coded incitements", as Frank Chalk describes these shared metaphoric allusions. One RTLM broadcast predicted that soon "one would have to reach for the top part of the house": the upper rafters, where weapons were traditionally stored in a Rwandan dwelling. The president of the interim government exhorted a crowd to ‘get to work’—a Rwandan expression referring to labor with machetes and axes. According to UN Special Rapporteur Rene Degni-Segui, such an expression "would hardly be misunderstood by a Rwandan public as an invitation to kill Tutsis." Local officials urged the people to "clear the bush", which meant eliminating Tutsi. "Pulling out the roots of the bad weeds" referred to killing Tutsi women and children so that the race could be thoroughly extinguished. The use of agricultural terms reminds an audience of the ancient division of labor by which Tutsi were associated with herding and Hutu with farming.

—Leaders in the Gaseke and Giciye communes assign the murder of Tutsis as the communal work duty, or umuganda, which every Rwandan contributes. By issuing such a direct command, these officials overcome conscience with the moral reassurance of following orders from above; but in addition, they establish genocide as a communal act in which everyone shares the work and reaps the reward.

—The same cultural references which alluded to a shared heritage also serve to make each listener feel unique, grant the superiority of being enlightened, attuned, 'in the know'. By speaking in such coded phrases, a broadcaster or public speaker invites the intellectual participation by which the riddle is solved, the answer deduced. A leader can tell anyone to kill a Tutsi, and anyone's first response may well be anger at being ordered about, or manipulated to serve the leader's ambitions. But a leader can also say that we must "make the Tutsi shorter", and not just anyone would understand that the Tutsi were supposedly distinguished from the Hutu by their great height; that the leader suggests being tall is not such a virtue—and thus, being Hutu is virtuous; that the way for virtuous Hutu to shorten the Tutsi is the machete.

—Understanding the human ego's revulsion at being thought gullible, weak, easily manipulated, and sensing the loyalty gained by persuading people to achieve a personal investment in the cause, the media plays up the value of independent discernment. Listeners are won over with appeals to their own intelligence and insight, while herd mentality is assigned to the enemy. Simon Bikindi's hit "I Hate these Hutu" conveys such a contempt for conformity. "I hate these Hutu, these Hutu who march blindly, like imbeciles, this species of naïve Hutu who are manipulated," he sings of Hutu who enticed by the Tutsi to feel sympathy for their cause and lose step with the genocidal spirit.

—One of RTLM's most novel and seductive techniques was the call-in format, which invited direct participation in a way novel to Rwandans. Never before had such a forum offered any citizen the opportunity to express his beliefs nationwide, without censorship or consequence. Listeners were assured that their ideas were important, deserved expression, and the innovation which granted such empowerment helped secure individual loyalty to the genocidal regime.